An important way of determining that our knowledge is consistent and repeatable (ie complete) is in predicting outcomes. When knowledge does this successfully, we extend our belief in it, leading to a science of conjectures. The fact that we are willing (in theory, at least) to test these conjectures to destruction leads to a science of refutations in Popper's manner (1969) .
However, scientific research is not always carried out according to Popper's ideal, which is impossibly ambitious for mere humans. Kuhn (1970) argued from historical observations. He divided science into the revolutionary, which is distinct from the more mundane and technical tasks of conserving the status quo that he calls normal science. Lakatos (1969) has indicated the development around accepted theories of "protective belts" that repel the unconventional.
Science as practised is not the ideal Popper suggests. We may aim for, but are not likely to attain, Popper's ideals. This difference between science as portrayed and done is important.
Research is carried out in two main arenas. The first is experiment; the second, theory. I am concerned with the actuality of what happens, in contrast to the "official presentation."
All this happens against a background of assumptions, for instance that something has always happened does not mean it always will. But we assume that the likelihood of it continuing to happen increases the more it has already happened, until…. 
Experiment
Experiments are the main means by which scientists extract knowledge of the world we inhabit. 10 They do this by radical simplification.
In the (idealised) scientific experiment we divide systems into distinct, isolated variables. We fix all but one of the variables, and change some factor we believe is influential in the behaviour of the system, realised in the free variable. Changing this factor, we observe any change in the behaviour of the system and attribute it to the response of that variable. We organise the "in and outputs" so that there appears to be a simple relationship, and we determine that this relationship is determined by the variable.
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We have devised methods (eg, statistics) for "faking" these conditions in complex systems where we cannot isolate variables, and/or where repeatibility is unattainable.
I am sure the reader is familiar with the above picture. What is left out is the experimenter. Yet how could there be an experiment without an experimenter?
The answer (based on simple experience: of doing experiments, and of language use and --3--happens, Cybernetics accommodates these arguments-see the last section.
9 As Wittgenstein (1971) elegantly points out. This is the age-old "Problem" of Induction.
10 I insist investigative actions must have active agents (I am a constructivist), which are, in the case of science, scientists (who are people). See the Black Box model referred to in the next footnote.
11 The theory of the Black Box, which has the added advantage we can never talk about "truth" as a result of using it. See Glanville 1979. what that implies for action) is straightforward. We cannot.
The experimenter chooses to do the experiment and sets it up (including determining the variables). 12 The experimenter observes, and determines what the outcomes are. The experimenter carries out the actions.
The experimenter continues until the system begins to perform as desired or required (for instance, moves the light source/screen/lens to get an in-focus image). And the experimenter determines when enough has been done, ie, who breaks the circle.
The experimenter designs the experiment, and if it doesn't work (well enough, in his opinion) redesigns it. The experimenter forms the outcome and assembles different observations into a coherent whole (relating them together). The experimenter may then tie the outcome into theory, modifying that accordingly. Reacting to changes in knowledge resulting from the experiments, the experimenter may rerun the experiment, perhaps with a new arrangement of the variables, or in a different place, to check repeatibility (ie stability). He may make predictions (which always requires a rerun). The experimenter plays with all aspects of the experiment until it produces results of the type desired.
These actions of the experimenter are circular. As a result of their circularity, novelty (the unexpected) may be observed, leading to a rerun under changed circumstances.
There are circularities in setting up and doing the experiment, in valuing what is found and integrating it. There are circularities of repetition. The whole process is deeply embedded in circularity, particularly the greatest of all scientific circularities: the active involvement of the experimenter (the observer).
Account
The traditional relating of (scientific experimental) research is highly formalised-like a Russian Icon! Taught to all school children, this depiction is intended to emphasise certain epistemological claims. So, observations are made in and of experiments. There is no agent, nobody does the observing. The experiment just comes into being (no one thinks of it or messes around until it works-ie, produces the desired type of result (whose desire?)). Results just appear, without anyone adjusting the experiment to gain the outcome required, such as moving optical elements to get a sharp focus, and only then taking measurements. Everything is automatic, a mechanism of great beauty and complexity, true in itself, beyond and not requiring human intervention (see Peter Medawar's charming and witty, "Is the Scientific Paper a Fraud?" 1963).
The undertaking is presented in a manner supporting the view that The Great Scientific Endeavour brings forth truths unsullied by human intervention, awaiting discovery in The Great Reality Out There. Nowadays, this position is unreasonable and untenable: it is hard to pursue the consequences to a logical conclusion, and take onboard the constructivist view --4-- 12 That the experimenter is influenced by social factors and epistemological outlook does not reduce his responsibility: he accepts these social factors and acts accordingly. that seems to emerge. In science, we have long been drilled otherwise.
This manner of accounting is post-rationalisation: the tidy explanation after the event of what was, perhaps, a rather different experience.
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In this traditional view, there is a power, a "right". There are solutions to problems because everything fits together in the mechanism. Indeed, it is already fitted together in nature: thus the universe proceeds. Define the problem, execute proper procedures, and the resulting output from the scientific machine must be correct. This view's power is that it works-pretty well, within the assumptions of the framework it is to demonstrate. (This modification provides the basis for studies in Chaos. See Gleick 1987 . Also, see the "Error Game" in Pask, Glanville and Robinson 1981) One could, therefore, assume research would lead to the "right" answer, at least until Popper (1969) . This is not the place for the interesting discussion of why we should no longer support this view (assuming it was ever valid).
14 We realise that the picture proposed by the traditional account is neither accurate nor credible-either about how we do research, or the response/output we can reasonably expect. The generally promulgated view held by which we account for our research through scientific experiment is inaccurate. (In fact, it is not nowadays held by major scientists: see, eg, Richard Feynman's "QED" (1985) .)
Over the last 30 years, linguistic analysis indicates the aims of the scientific communication and the use of language indicating this have changed. Publications are no longer concerned with "the truth"; they communicate the author's (or the editor's) wish to join or remain in a group of fellow workers (Hunston 1993, Hyland 1997, Glanville, Forey and Sengupta, forthcoming) . This finding holds for physicists as for social scientists. The first person has found expression again: papers are written by I's. Designers know they are not dealing with "the truth" except metaphysically, eg truth to materials (the Architectural Association's motto is "Design in Beauty, Build in Truth"): and they know there is no design without them, the designers.
We also nowadays understand that the description is not the experience; the explanation is not the actuality; prediction is not mechanism.
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Finally, we fail to mention the actual processes of writing/reporting-as above! --5--
Theory
Theory is what turns the (collections of) observations we build into science. It may not make these collections science, but, if not sufficient, it is necessary. However, this paper is not primarily concerned with what makes science, but the role of theory in research.
In my understanding, theory in research has the following two roles.
First, to combine, co-ordinate and simplify the findings of experiments by developing generalising concepts.
Second, to examine these concepts in order to further clarify and develop them, reflecting back extended understandings into theory: and, by suggesting experiments that might be performed, into experiment for verification
The relationship between theory and experiment is essentially circular. They might be thought of as partners in a very slow conversation carried out over a very long time.
And the role of theory is to simplify, to generalise.
Theory from Experiment
The first aspect of theory, theory from experiment, involves pattern finding. Humans look for patterns. Piaget (1955) insists the child develops a view of the world as he/she becomes able to distinguish objects: that is, create constancy between separate perceptions on separate occasions ("object constancy"). 16 Pattern finding, the making of one concept from many distinct perceptions, is an intensely human activity. Theories are patterns given widespread credence and accepted as accounting for a part of our experience.
Since, in Popper's characterisation, theories are not provable, they remain only temporarily valid, awaiting disproval. They fall into a category that includes Occam's Razor. The criterion-relative simplicity-of Occam's Razor is no more provable than "randomness" (see Chaitin (1975) , Glanville (1977 Glanville ( , 1981 ). To assert something is random is to assert that no pattern has been found, yet. There is no absolute truth in simplicity: rather, there is convenience, coherence and consistency. 17 Occam's criterion can be neither proved (it is a matter of taste) nor properly tested (although it has intuitive validity and we like it to hold-it is the means by which, for example, Newton's universe is subsumed in Einstein's).
Why do we want to simplify?
To make the "continuum" of our experience de-finite, handleable within limited (finite) resources (see Ashby 1964 , Glanville 1994 , 1997a ).
If we did not simplify by (constantly) making (constant) objects constant, we would never be --6-- 16 George Spencer Brown's "Logic of Distinction" (1969) is based on this concept. My first PhD (Glanville 1975) was concerned with how, although we perceive differently we can still believe we see the same "Object".
17 This is the problem facing those wishing to demonstrate absolute "scientific" certainty in, for instance, the non-transmission of BSE, or, more recently, of H5N2 (Hong Kong bird flu) to humans. Popper's point is that science attempts to disprove, so validity is temporary. able to recognise them: nor would we "cognise" "perceptions" as being of "objects". The world we lived in would have no object, and we would not be able to conceive, let alone speak, of our own I's. To "cognise" would be beyond inconceivable. We would live in the continuum, the void: about which we cannot speak, for to speak is to distinguish and make objects. Nirvana. In a word, .
Nor could we generalise, finding similarities in behaviour and learning from repetition so we can venture the belief that because some (observed) behaviour of some object has always held, it will always hold (see footnotes 7 and 9)! So strongly do we believe in such simplification that, when we find discrepancies, we explain them away as errors, rather than a demonstration that simplification necessarily omits something. By this device we maintain our theories.
Theory formalises the significance and necessity of pattern. Pattern gives us objects and recognisable behaviours, allowing us to predict, and risk living by our predictions.
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Prediction is a means for extending the range of our observations and the patterns we have constructed-of pre-forming our worlds. Living by the assertion that pattern X exists and because X has always happened it will always happen, we extend the range of application of the pattern to become a prediction, taking control of the future so we pursue certain courses of action.
Believing something is constant leads us to stop thinking about it: it becomes habit. For instance, if I have a route I regularly use, it forms (and severely limits) my actions and I treat it as causative. An accident (or similar) leads to confusion and loss of control. My chain of causes has been broken.
Similarly, we make simplifications forming the base of our science (and our personal knowledge (science-as in Kelly's Personal Scientist 1955) ). We determine that objects fall to earth unless constrained and we generalise. Examining the generalisation, we extract a simple principle. We use the principle to cover other areas of observation: objects whirling around on strings do not fall to earth as long as they whirl fast enough, which we extend as an expanded understanding to the planets, as if whirling on invisible strings. There we move to Theory from Theory.
Theory from Theory (from Experiment)
The second type of theory is the examination of concepts to clarify (hence, develop) these concepts further, reflecting the extended understandings back on the theory and suggesting experiments to be carried out.
While science thought itself essentially empirical, there was always a theoretical area. In some accounts, mathematics (or logic-Russell and Whitehead 1927) is the queen of the --7--18 I will examine the connection between how we think and what design is in another paper. But I believe this account indicates my belief: that design constitutes our way of thinking.
sciences. Theoretical science abounds today. For instance, particle physics inhabits a universe of theoretical discourse and is essentially theory driven. 19 Sometimes such areas return to experiment, but not always. Science depends not only on theory based in collecting and organising evidence (simplifying it to form patterns), but also on theory based in examining the consequences of that evidence and its simplification through the logical examination of, for instance, both a particular pattern, and patterns in general.
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In building theory from (and of) theory, we use the same devices we use to build theory: simplification, pattern finding. As well as the objects we have found, we treat relations and the patterns they are held to pertain to also as objects. Using the devices of theory on theory, we act self-referentially: and self-reference is, necessarily, circular. We make theory about theory just as we make theory: we find the pattern of pattern.
We use these understandings (devices)-simplification, pattern finding-to develop our understandings, especially how we understand these understandings (the understanding of understanding). Thus, our understandings help us develop our understandings, but also restrict them. When we find contradictions, we either modify or reject these understandings and start again: from the original, where necessary. Ie, we return to our initial simplifications. This circular process is, I argue, a design process: of continuous modification and unification, the inclusion of more and more in a coherent whole; occasional re-start, extension and revolution; the increase in range and of simplification ("Less is More").
From our (re-)new(ed) understanding we suggest how experiment allows us to test our simplification through an interaction in which both we and the personal reality we make for ourselves find confirmation, extension and modification (and renewal).
Note how all of this requires an agent. We do it. It does not happen by itself. We do not even uncover: we make and we test, and where necessary, we modify. We are always present, as active agents. What we do is circular because that is the way we do it.
One form of doing theory from theory is criticism. This paper is a form of criticism, reconsidering theory from a position of (and as) theory. The act of reading (or writing) this paper is making theory from theory (about the theory from which theory is made!). So it is part of a design process: it reflects the theory (of science) back on itself. It focuses (simplifies) reflecting certain aspects, finding a pattern: of circularity and of the observer's involvement. In this paper, the criticism is essentially self-referential. But criticism not deriving from theory itself is, nevertheless, theory applied to theory, within a wider setting. For criticism involves an abstracting from theorising, to permit and encourage a (general) theoretical overview.
--8--
Part II: the World of Design
Reflex I contend what I described in Part I of this paper is design, and is design at many levels. And, therefore, (scientific) research is a form of design-a specifically restricted form. If this is so, it is inappropriate to require design to be "scientific": for scientific research is a subset (a restricted form) of design, and we do not generally require the set of a subset to act as the sub subset to that subset any more than we require the basement of the building is its attic.
That (scientific) research is a hidden branch of design leads to peculiarities! It is strange an area for so long claiming the uncovering of truth as its purpose itself seems dishonest about what it does and how it does it.
To indicate (scientific) research is a variety of design as forcefully as possible, I shall explain what I mean by "design", reminding the reader how the qualities of that characterisation are found in my earlier description of (scientific) research.
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What is Design
There have been many answer to the question of what design is. The characterisation that is used in this paper concentrates on design as a means of exercising our creativity.
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Recapitulating, design is a word used in several ways which has, in English, the form both of noun and verb. In this paper, design is mainly thought of as a verb, indicating action. Central to the act of design is circularity. Here, in my view, creativity enters (Glanville 1980a (Glanville , 1995a , which is at the centre of my interest. Other aspects (eg solving a stated problem), although often understood as crucial, are not, I maintain, central to the study of the design act, no matter how important. Problem solving is its own discipline. I am happy to leave it to those interested.
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I characterise design (after Pask 1969) as a conversation, usually held via a medium such a paper and pencil, with an other (either an "actual" other or oneself acting as an other) as the conversational partner. The word conversation is used in a recognisable and everyday manner.
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(Pask eventually developed notions of the conversation into a highly refined technical theory --9--21 I like to believe this holds for all research, because for research to be distinct from assertion requires validation: it is not enough to assemble a few ideas in whatever way we fancy; we must test these ideas (honestly and fairly) for consistency, correspondence with experience (reality), and communion. I shall not pursue this argument here.
22 See Glanville 1980a , 1994 , 1995a , 1997b , 1998c . This is my normal characterisation. 23 Some postulate primitive problem solving as a first venture towards design. History is as much a construction as any other account. I do not deny problem solving and design co-incide. But I insist design takes a space of its own. 24 A conversation is a circular form of communication, in which understandings are exchanged. In a conversation, participants build meanings through the conversational form, rather than trying to communicate a predetermined meaning through coding. In conversation, words do not hold meaning-we do. See Glanville 1995b. of sophistication and some difficulty (Pask 1975 , 1976 , Glanville 1993 , 1998b ).
Design-as-conversation will be familiar from the doodle on the back from the envelope upwards. I believe the value of the doodle is an instance of creativity firing the doodler's enthusiasm, personal research and commitment.
Creativity may also be found elsewhere. But this circular process is certainly one in which novelty-a distinguishing feature of design and so typical of creativity-can be generated.
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Design and Research
(Scientific) research (whether experiment or theory) is a design activity. We design experiments, but we also act as designers in how we act in these experiments. We design the experiences and objects we find through experiment by finding commonalities (simplification): and we design how we assemble them into patterns (explanatory principles, theories). Looking at these patterns, we make further patterns from them-the theories of our theories. Thus, in doing science, we learn.
The manner in which we do this is circular-conversational (in Pask's sense): we act iteratively, until reaching self-re-inforcing stability or misfit. We test, until we arrive at something satisfying our desires-for stability/recognisability/repeatibility/etc. Thus we arrive at our understandings. We test and test again, repeat with refinement and extend, and when driving to extremes we find our patterns no longer hold, we rejig them or start again from scratch. We adumbrate the special within the more general, coming to resting points where we say (as in design) "this is ok, I can get no further just now".
It is we who do it: we act. The role of observer-as-participant, in making knowledge, abstracting it to theory, theorising about theory; and in constructing the way we obtain this knowledge, then obtaining it accordingly, is central/essential/unavoidable/inevitable and completely desirable. Without the active participation of this actor, there would be nothing that we would know. At every step, in every action, the observer/participant is actively designing. There is nothing passive, automatic or without person (agent, scientist, designer), here.
No matter how regrettable or distasteful this may appear to traditional scientists and others drilled in the convention (the distortion) of presentation by which science puts forward its discoveries and the claims it makes for them, it is a consequence of this examination of how we do science and what we do with what we learn from doing it.
(Scientific) research is a branch of design, in which the designer is central, and through which we construct the world of (and according to) the scientific knowledge we design.
So the act of design, as we understand and value it, has much to offer as an example of how science and scientific research might be in a new era: an era that designer-readers will recognise as their contemporary paradigm and which is how scientists, when we talk to them, recognise and characterise their own activity. Design, being the more general case, satisfies Occam's razor for simplicity: as Einstein is to Newton, design is to science and scientific research.
Conclusion: Research and Design
There are differences between design and (scientific) research: otherwise they would be indistinguishable and we would only need one word (Glanville 1980b ). The differences, traditionally emphasised, are not my concern. My intention has been to show that (scientific) research, as it is and must be practised, is properly considered a branch of design: (scientific) research is a subset of design, not the other way round. This is the reason for the potted history in the Prologue. We who are interested in design and in researching into it are still inclined to insist we should prosecute our research according to the old and no longer sustainable view of (scientific) research: which view removes from design-and from how we consider and present it-which makes it central, important and valuable, exactly that which characterises it. Even while scientists come to realise their creative involvement in their processes.
We, in design research, should redress this imbalance, indicating the primacy and centrality of design both as an object of study and a means of carrying out that study; insisting on the impropriety of demands that design perform according to criteria of (scientific) research when design is that which encapsulates and embodies this. (Scientific) research should be judged by design criteria, not the other way round. We need to learn to believe in design, to live this, no longer apologising, but refusing to downplay what we do, kowtowing to an old and falsely elevated view.
We should not let the misrepresentations of (scientific) research be forced on us as an insensitive straitjacket. This does not mean we should not glory in the successes (and beauty) of (scientific) research. We should learn from what it offers us, including the lessons of this paper. There are qualities essential (and all too often forgotten) in design which are remembered and given primacy in (scientific) research, such as rigour, honesty, clarification and testing, and the relative strength of argument over assertion. Especially now, when design researchers are again asking about the benefits available from other disciplines, we should look for disciplines that study circularity and the included observer-participant for the insights they may afford us into the operation and consequences of those processes in our research, and what that might mean to us. That is, disciplines that are, at their base, sympathetic to design. Otherwise we forsake our primacy and dance to the wrong tune played by the wrong fiddler, who scarcely believes in the tune any more but who will, nevertheless, call the tune when we ask him to because to do so retains his primacy.
Design is the key to research. Research has to be designed. Considering design carefully (making theory from or even researching it) can reveal how better to act, do research-to design research. And how better to acknowledge design in research: as a way of understanding, acting, looking, searching.
But design should be studied on design's terms. For, design is the form, the basis. And research is a design act. Perhaps that is why it is beautiful?
Design's Secret Partner in Research.
As it happens, there is one subject that is concerned with the philosophical, psychological --11--and mechanical examination of just these issues: cybernetics.
Over the last 30 years, and visible largely through application in other areas, it has (in the form of "second order cybernetics" or the "cybernetics of cybernetics", the "new cybernetics") explored the nature of circular systems and those actions in which the observer (in the most general sense) is a participant. Cybernetics has elucidated conversation, creativity and the invention of the new; multiple viewpoints and their implications for their objects of attention; self-generation and "the emergence" of stability; post rationalisation, representation and experience; constructivism; and distinction drawing and the theory of boundaries.
In this, cybernetics has been explicitly concerned with the qualities we have found to invest research and which are designerly.
This recent manifestation of cybernetics is not to be confused with that for which such large and absurd claims were made at much the same time that the early and determinist ("scientific") approaches in design research were being pushed as the powerful way forward for design. It is a much gentler and more introspective subject, although its approach can be clearly derived from the original (Glanville 1987b 1998a , von Foerster 1974 .
Given this similarity of concern and of formation, it is no surprise that, over these last 30 years, cybernetics has learnt much from design, nor that many of those most intimately involved in the development of this new cybernetics have come from or been closely involved with design.
